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Over the past decades, Hong Kong and Taiwan have both developed a unique 
local or national identity. These have become a subject of great scholarly interest 
since the 1990s, coinciding with democratization in Taiwan and the handover of 
Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1997. These political 
changes have influenced the formation of identities in both areas. Although the 
individual identities remain strong, they are faced with the challenges of 
globalization and the consequences of interaction with a powerful China. 
Hong Kong and Taiwan serve as excellent examples for a cross-case analysis of 
identity formation in the so-called Greater China area. Both entities share a 
similar socio-economic background and development, and an authoritarian past 
that de-emphasized political participation through a strong emphasis on traditional 
Chinese (political) culture. The issue of identity plays an important role in society 
and politics, although with different strengths and emphases. The democratic 
development of Hong Kong and Taiwan and their relations with China offer good 
opportunities for the comparison of national identity issues in both places. 
This article will analyze the formation of the Hong Kong identity, the changes it 
has undergone and the challenges it faces. The study will reveal similarities to and 
differences from the development in Taiwan and show to what extent identities are 
constructed through and based on ethno-cultural and civic identity. Today, the 
Hong Kong identity has to assert itself against a variety of threats and changes, 
most notably, rapid integration with the Chinese mainland in economic and, 
increasingly, in socio-political terms. This paper concludes that the civic part of 
the Hong Kong identity has remained the most resilient, despite the absence of 
full democracy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). The 
Hong Kong case does provide valuable insights for the Taiwan identity, in times 
of wide-ranging cooperation with China. Taiwan’s civic identity possesses the 
additional components of a successful democratic struggle and nationhood and 
thus will likely prevail in the foreseeable future.  
The theoretical framework for this paper is provided by theories of national 
identity construction, followed by an examination of identity formation in the 
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ethno-cultural and civic realm in Hong Kong. Quantitative studies offer insights 
into changes in citizens’ identification after 1997. Finally, a comparison with 
Taiwan looks at the similarities and differences in identity formation in both 
places.  
 
THEORIES OF NATIONAL IDENTITY 
Today, the national identity of Hong Kong as a part of the PRC is unquestionable. 
However, the majority of the people still identify themselves as either Hong 
Kongers or Hong Kong Chinese and not as Chinese. The distinct identity that 
evolved in the city is more than a metropolitan identity, such as, the Shanghainese 
in China or the New Yorkers in the USA. For more than 150 years, Hong Kong 
was a separate political entity (Lau 2005). The Hong Kong identity connotes 
affluence, openness to the world, professionalism and pragmatism and in this it 
has remained distinct from and to some extent “opposed to Chinese identity with 
its attachment to a particular tradition, ethnicity, and nationality” (Mathews, Lui 
and Ma 2008: 11). 
Research on national identity has produced numerous theoretical approaches to 
this subject. Regarding the definition of origin and nature of national identity, the 
debate is positioned between essentialist and constructivist approaches. The 
essential or primordial view of national identity assumes that certain group 
identities and attachments are given, based on blood, race, language and territory 
which possess a deep “coerciveness” (Geertz 1963: 259). On the other hand, the 
constructivist approach to the study of national identity views the nation as an 
“imagined political community,” stresses its invention and creation and refuses 
any primordialism (Anderson 1983: 6). 
The influential dichotomy in the understanding of the national identity of civic 
identity versus ethnic or cultural identity is located along these lines. Anthony D. 
Smith argues that the civic model entails a historic territory, a legal-political 
community of equal members, articulated in a set of rights and duties and a 
common civic culture and ideology. On the other hand the ethnic concept 
emphasizes a community of birth and native culture including vernacular 
languages, customs and traditions (Smith 1991: 11-12). However, he also 
acknowledges that most states and nations contain both “civic and ethnic elements 
in varying degrees and different forms” (ibid. 13). Smith’s definition contains a 
dual notion of culture
1
 – native culture in the ethno-cultural realm and civic 
culture in the civic realm. Civic culture always includes an element of 
participation in the political sphere, while native culture can be understood as the 
experience of day to day life in the neighborhood or at grassroots level. Related to 
this, is the idea of lifestyles understood as “routines incorporated into habits of 
dress, eating, modes of acting and favorite milieux for encountering others” 
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(Giddens 1991: 81). Borders between the realms of civic and ethno-cultural 
identity are a matter of degree. When Western (political) values become 
entrenched in the lifestyle of the population, they can foster the desire to 
participate and help to develop a civic identity. Anthony Smith’s research on 
national identity is valuable in the context of this analysis which makes an 
argument for a unique civic and ethno-cultural identity of the Taiwan and Hong 
Kong people vis-à-vis the Chinese on the mainland.  
 
EVOLUTION OF HONG KONG IDENTITY 
In the first decades of the colony, there were few signs of a distinct local identity 
and one key feature of the Chinese living there prior to the Second World War 
was, in fact, their “sojourner mentality”: most of them were economic migrants or 
refugees who intended to return to China after they had made sufficient money for 
a more comfortable life back home (Tsang 2003: 222). This ended in 1950 when 
the border to China was effectively closed (Ku 2004: 335). Those born in Hong 
Kong after 1949 did not have any first-hand experiences of the PRC, until it 
opened up in the late 1970s. Separation from the Chinese mainland for the 
following decades
2
 allowed Hong Kong to develop a political culture and an 
identity of its own (Tsang 2003: 223).  
 
ETHNO-CULTURAL IDENTITY  
Economic Development  
One major structural development that provided a great impetus for the advance 
of a local identity was the transformation of Hong Kong’s economy from an 
entrepôt economy to a capitalist economy (Lau and Lee 1988: 24). An early 
attempt to describe an emerging distinct identity was the “Hong Kong Man”; 
Westernized but Chinese, yet different from British colonizers as well as mainland 
Chinese (Baker 1983: 478). The awareness of the vast socioeconomic differences 
between the crown colony and the Chinese mainland had developed in a sense of 
cultural distance or even superiority to the mainland Chinese. The Hong Kong 
identity has built upon this view of a sophisticated, affluent “us” and a poor, 
backward “other” (Ku 2002: 356).  
 
Popular Culture and Education 
The importance of the popular culture in the formation of a distinct cultural 
identity can be explained by the non-interventionist attitude of the colonial 
government: “In the absence of any hegemonic framework of high culture, 
national culture, and so forth, popular culture in Hong Kong must play the role – 
set the agenda – of ‘culture’ per se” (Chan 1994: 449). This culture was 
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transmitted through the popular media (Ma 1999: 23) which was discursively 
entrenched in Western values. It transformed the Chinese cultural characteristics 
particular to Hong Kong, articulated local experiences and concerns, crystallized 
images of a distinct “Hong Kong way of life” (Fung 2004: 401) and popularized 
the term, “Hong Kong person” (Ma 1999: 13). First and foremost, television and 
film contributed to the articulation of a separate Hong Kong identity where the 
cultural differences between Hong Kongers and mainland Chinese were 
particularly emphasized (Ma 2006). Only through this “othering” of the 
Mainlanders was a distinctive local identity made possible (Ma and Fung 1999: 
500). Popular culture was the key force which socialized youngsters to become 
Hong Kongers, because the Anglicized education system provided little guidance 
in terms of identity. It taught a depoliticized, culturalist version of Chinese 
identity and was detached from the local context, with Hong Kong’s own history 
completely absent from the curriculum (Vickers and Kan 2003: 206). The meager 
civic education curriculum focused on descriptions of social services and other 
benefits provided by the colonial administration (Fairbrother 2003) and was 
largely depoliticized in order to dampen the political consciousness of young 
people who might otherwise question authority (Leung 1996: 291). The 
government endorsed the image of the crown colony as an economic city and 
downplayed the local, civic identity (Vickers 2003: 196).  
 
Western Values and the Market 
Studies by Eric Ma and Anthony Fung (2007) illustrated differences in political 
values between those who identified themselves as Hong Kongers and those who 
identified themselves as Chinese. Being “Westernized” was identified as a key 
means of differentiation from China, confirming “that the global or Western 
element in the Hong Kong identity is a major component that makes it stand out.” 
Other top values are press freedom and freedom of speech – Western concepts of 
institutional expression. Furthermore, privacy and equality are ideas concerned 
with basic individual rights and also cannot be regarded as indigenously Chinese 
(Fung 2008: 197). According to Anthony Fung, the Hong Kong identity is 
characterized by local economic values as well as the local consumer culture. 
Hence the global capitalist culture is a strong component of the local identity 
(ibid. 193). Global values and culture become a protector of local identity against 
national intervention from the mainland Chinese side (ibid. 200).  
The importance of the market for identity construction has inspired the thesis of 
the “market mentality” of Hong Kong people with regard to their attitude toward 
national identity (Mathews, Lui and Ma 2008). Accordingly, the emerging local 
identity was influenced by the rapid socio-economic development of the time. The 
so-called Hong Kong dream – a bit of luck and hard work, and you can make it – 
created a “market mentality,” and thus many citizens did not subscribe to the idea 
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of “belonging to a nation” as the basis of their lives (ibid. 13). A market-based 
sense of national identity is characterized by individual choice, and by self-
interest paralleling national interest. The “patriotism of the rational” is based on 
the “individual’s investment of loyalty to the country for his or her own benefit” 
(ibid. 161). 
 
Cultural Memory  
The 2003 respiratory disease SARS, and a mass demonstration against the 
government and the proposed national security law on 1 July, marked the 
appearance of a community spirit embodying greater civic awareness (Yeung 
2007) as well as a new surge in social movements, organized not by political 
parties but a by wide range of grassroots organizations. For the most part, the so-
called third and fourth generation of Hong Kongers who were involved in these 
movements refrain from ideologically motivated actions (Lü 2007: 49, 66). The 
cultural critic, Chan Koon-chung, points to the visceral level at which “locals have 
an unmistakable sense of their identity and rooted common culture” (Chan 2007: 
384). At this level, personal memories are connected to the space and sites of daily 
life. In Hong Kong, where the culture has been described as a “culture of 
disappearance”3 (Abbas 1997), identification with the material environment has 
always been difficult. In Ming K. Chan’s analysis, Hong Kong people were 
looking for anchors and places of belonging in the decade after 1997, when the 
local identity came under threat. When reconstructing and affirming their own 
past as an integral part of the Hong Kong community, this past was expressed 
through “collective memory construction.” Collective memory construction and 
movements are often linked to old artefacts, public sites and long existing 
structures, such as the Star Ferry in Central District (Chan 2008: 18). The heritage 
conservation movement was therefore tied to concerns about the erasure of a part 
of Hong Kong’s cultural identity, implying a common destiny and values that 
have to be preserved (Lo 2007: 436) The importance of heritage preservation for 
the local identity is further emphasized by the involvement of the late teenage and 
early twenties generation of Hong Kong youth, which is actively seeking local 
contexts for identity formation (Cartier 2008: 76). By comparing it to the 1960s 
movements An argues that the Star Ferry protests are a means for the Handover 
generation to establish an identity of its own, which is intrinsic to the Hong Kong 
identity (An 2007). Eric Ma echoes this view and sees a new city consciousness 
surfacing through the struggle over harbor protection, participation in the West 
Kowloon Cultural District project and the rebuilding of Wan Chai. This indicates 
an increasing desire for political participation as well as a strengthening of the 
development of social groups. To be a Hong Kong person means to be actively 
involved in Hong Kong affairs since a local identity can only be created through 
the continuous recreating of Hong Kong society (Ma and Liang 2005) With regard 
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to the basis of the Hong Kong identity, it indicates a paradigm shift in Hong 
Kong’s local culture. After 1997, the Hong Kong identity based on popular culture 
became weaker as sinicization and globalization exacted a heavy toll on the 
uniqueness of the popular culture industry. The new city consciousness might be 
able to provide a foundation to strengthen a distinctive cultural identity and to 
position the territory internationally, nationally, regionally and locally (Ma 2006). 
 
CIVIC IDENTITY 
Myth of Political Apathy  
For a long time, Hong Kong’s political culture was portrayed as being dominated 
by political apathy and traditional Confucian culture (King 1981, Lau 1981). 
Identity in the colony was formed by a “fear of politics” (White and Li 1993: 18). 
Hong Kong was seen as a “lifeboat” offering relative stability, impartial justice, 
and economic opportunity in the cruel sea of China. Political activities would only 
create unnecessary conflict and dissent (Hoadley 1970: 211). The parochial and 
individualistic behavior as well as the political apathy of Hong Kongers were 
explained by so-called “utilitarianistic familism” – individuals putting their 
families’ interests and materialistic concerns before the interests of society (Lau 
1981: 201). The perceived lack in the sense of community spirit, political 
involvement, and hence the non-existence of the Western notion of citizenship, 
justified the denial of democratic self-determination (Turner 1995: 36). Research 
since the late 1990s has adopted a broader definition for the political participation 
of Hong Kong people, thus the “myth of political apathy” (DeGolyer and Scott 
1996) has largely been refuted. Important acts of political participation, such as 
strikes, participation in social movements and demonstrations were previously not 
considered (Lam 2004: 19) and individual political participation at grassroots 
level as well as the political awareness of Hong Kongers were not included in 
previous analyses (Lo 1999: 51).  
 
Political Identity 
Political events since the 1960s, however, have shown the increasing desire for 
political participation and articulation, and have contributed in several ways to the 
establishment of a strong civic Hong Kong identity. Protests in 1966 marked the 
emergence of a trend toward local issues being discussed more vigorously in the 
domestic political arena, put forward by the post-war generation of Hong Kongers 
(Turner 1995: 26; Mathews, Lui and Ma 2008: 32). The 1967 riots, sparked by the 
Cultural Revolution on the mainland, reinforced the existing Mainlander versus 
Hong Konger dichotomy, reaffirming Hong Kong’s culture, governing ideology 
and way of life (Thomas 1999: 85). In the 1970s, the government reacted to an 
increasingly vocal social movement (So 1999) by launching a broad program of 
social and administrative reforms (So 1999; Lam 2004). By the early 1980s, the 
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colonial government had transformed into a modern polity characterized by 
relative openness, responsiveness, freedom, the Anglo-Saxon concept of the rule 
of law, the protection of human rights and stability (Hayes 1996: 281). When the 
transfer of sovereignty was decided in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, 
this had an important consequence for Hong Kong’s identity as a fusion of 
Western and Chinese influences (Bhattacharya 2005: 51). Hong Kongers hoped 
for democratization as a means of safeguarding their own way of life under the 
principle of “one country, two systems.” The call for more political participation 
was rooted in the promise of self-administration for Hong Kong after 1997 
(Cheng 1997: 156) and was also a consequence of the social changes and 
demands of the 1970s (Yahuda 1996: 57). More than any other event in the 
modern history of Hong Kong, 1989 Tiananmen massacre forced the territory’s 
local community to form an opinion as to what constituted their identity (Thomas 
1999: 87). The massive demonstrations in support of the students and workers in 
Beijing created a sense of unity among the Hong Kongers and showed that the 
people of Hong Kong would respond to a common cause (Yee 1989: 231). When 
substantial democratic reforms were implemented by the last governor, 
Christopher Patten, they served as a catalyst, improving the political 
consciousness and democratic aspirations of the Hong Kong people, and further 
strengthening their civic identity (Lo 2001: 50-53).  
By the end of the colonial era, the Hong Kong people had developed a strong, 
distinct identity based on the differences between Hong Kong and the Chinese 
mainland in economic, cultural and political terms (Chan 2007: 383). This Hong 
Kong identity could best be understood as “Chineseness plus,” since Hong 
Kongers are ethnically Chinese and in abstract cultural and historic terms, most of 
them feel that they are part of the Chinese nation
4
 (Mathews 1997: 9). Yet, at the 
same time, they are different. Their unique way of life, the value pertaining to 
freedom of expression, the rule of law, transparency, social mobility, responsible 
government and democracy were, in the last decades, guaranteed and provided by 
the British rulers. Hence, despite years of propaganda and with Chinese patriotism 
at a highpoint, only a slim majority stated that they were happy about the return to 
China
5
 (Mathews, Lui and Ma 2008: 49). 
 
Civic Values 
The analysis has shown that local identity is founded on economic and Western 
values, which became particularly noticeable after the handover. The severe 
economic downturn shattered the self-confidence of the Hong Kongers (Zhang 
2009). Their feeling of superiority vis-à-vis the mainland, the “Hong Kongism,” 
was further tested by the failed policies of the Tung Chee-hwa administration. 
Anthony Cheung suggests that the prime supporter of Hong Kong’s values and its 
identity was the middle class which was seriously affected by post-handover 
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changes. The Hong Kong identity could, in civic terms, be understood as a set of 
core values
6
 that includes civil liberties, the rule of law, respect for human rights, 
accountable government, democratic institutions, and political pluralism (Cheung 
2005: 58). Ensuring certain upward mobility and ever-expanding job and business 
opportunities are also part of this value package (ibid. 65). Government policies 
for integration with China were perceived as leading to the increasing dilution of 
the international character of the city (Cheung 2005). When the basis of the Hong 
Kong identity was threatened by assimilation through this increasing integration, 
the people resisted with frequent protests within all sectors of society (Cheung 
2007: 89). Anthony Cheung argues for a linkage between the Hong Kong identity, 
the city’s core values and political participation (Zhang 2000: 38). The emergence 
of the Civic Party provides a prime example of this connection.
7
 And obviously, 
the mass demonstration on 1 July 2003 marked a turning point and politicized the 
middle class (Zhang 2003: 81).  
 
Political Rituals and Protests 
The discourse of social and political participation as the foundation of a new 
emerging Hong Kong identity is based on the idea that unified actions will create 
a sense of belonging and cultural identification with the city and its people. 
Popular imagination and the practice and memories of certain similar customs and 
rituals, such as, participation in replicated events, manifest the cultural 
identification of the individual with the community. The people’s collectively 
shared beliefs and faiths are the common substance of this community (Lo 2007: 
435). The annual candle-light vigil in memory of the victims of the Tiananmen 
massacre is a “secular democratic ritual,” constituting a fundamental part of the 
political culture and political identity of Hong Kong. Participation is a way of 
showing the conviction that only democracy will maintain the Special 
Administrative Region (SAR) identity and way of life (Beja 2007: 7, Loh 2007: 
40). 1989 was a key moment in the development of political awareness and in the 
formation of a new political culture. The discourse of June 4 highlights the 
differences between the Hong Kong identity with its core values and the official 
Chinese national identity, as the latter includes the refusal to acknowledge the 
Tiananmen massacre (Beja 2007: 7). In Hong Kong, large scale demonstrations 
with a couple of thousand or even one hundred thousand participants have always 
been related to political issues – more precisely, they are usually triggered by the 
perception that the Hong Kong way of life is under threat (ibid.) as, for example, 
in the case of the mass demonstration of 1 July 2003. The mismanagement of the 
SARS epidemic had led to weakened trust in the HKSAR government. The crisis 
demonstrated that the Hong Kong values of transparency, freedom of expression 
and information and freedom of the press, were crucial in the battling of the 
disease, but these were constantly undermined by the government (DeGolyer 
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2004a). When the bill for a national security law under Article 23 of the Basic 
Law was launched, the common perception was that the Tung Chee-hwa 
administration was about to destroy these cherished values.
 8
 More than 500,000 
people protested against the government and against Article 23. The 
demonstration marked a strong rejection of government attitudes that were 
associated with mainland Chinese politics and it also functioned as a reassurance 
of the Hong Kong identity for the participants. The demonstrations were a source 
of pride and thus a resource for the long- term cultivation of local identification 
(Chan and Chung 2003). Collectively, they were an expression of the fact that the 
Hong Kong people shared certain values and beliefs (Wu 2003). In 2004, the mass 
demonstration of 1 July was of similar size and asked for the introduction of 
universal suffrage in 2007/8 which had been rejected by the National People’s 
Congress in Beijing only months earlier. Hence this movement was a confirmation 
of the civic Hong Kong identity vis-à-vis the Chinese understanding of national 
identity (Li 2004). The 1 July demonstrations have, since then, become an annual 
event and part of the collective memory of Hong Kongers and the Hong Kong 
identity.  
 
IDENTITY CHANGES  
Several studies have traced the changes in the self-identification of the Hong 
Kong people. The data used in this article stems from the Hong Kong Transition 
Project (HKTP) at the Hong Kong Baptist University. The HKTP defines 
“Chinese” as a patriotic statement and “Hong Kong Chinese” as a regional 
identity, not stronger than Shanghainese or New Yorker. “Hong Kong person” or 
“Hong Konger,” however, connotes a separate identity from “Chinese” or “Hong 
Kong Chinese” (DeGolyer 1997, 15). The principal distinguishing features 
between the different identity categories are attitudes towards democracy and 
patriotism (Lau and Lee 1988, 184). To be a “Hong Konger” means to be the most 
liberal and the most supportive of democracy, and the least supportive of 
nationalistic values. It also means to put the interests of Hong Kong over those of 
China (Wong 1998, Lee and Chan 2005). 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
In general, the survey data indicates a gradual increase in those holding a 
“Chinese” or “Hong Kong Chinese” identity. However, “Hong Konger” still 
remains the identity choice of the majority. More precisely, the HKTP has 
recorded a slight increase in the Chinese identity category from 20 per cent in 
1993 to about 20 per cent throughout the late 2000s (23 per cent in May 2009). At 
the same time, the category “Hong Kong person,” has fallen from an average of 
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40 per cent plus in 2007 to 38 per cent in spring 2009. The self-description “Hong 
Kong Chinese,” as a weaker local identity, experienced a steady rise throughout 
the transition period from levels of around 30 per cent to up to 35 per cent in May 
2009 (DeGolyer 2009). Reasons for these changes can be attributed to the policies 
of the HKSAR government, which launched a program to promote the patriotism 
of the citizens and also made accordant changes in the school curricula. Combined 
with steady immigration from China,
9
 an impact on the Hong Kong identity can 
therefore be assumed
10
 and a long-term trend towards a rise in the Chinese 
identity seems likely.  
 
HONG KONG AND CHINESE IDENTITY  
Hong Kong people identify strongly with a set of Western liberal-democratic core 
values and therefore with institutions that represent these values, such as the 
ICAC
11
 and the judiciary. Trust in the legislature is, however, low (Wong, Hsiao 
and Wan 2009) and satisfaction with the government and political parties 
fluctuates at levels similar to other pluralistic states in East Asia or in Western 
democracies (ibid., Cheung 2009). The low identification with the political 
institutions can largely be attributed to their lack of power and un-democratic 
nature. Surveys have indicated that Hong Kong people have a strong need for a 
responsive and democratic government and legislature (DeGolyer 2009), a fact 
which is further emphasized by the frequent mass protests for universal suffrage 
and by the pro-democracy forces always gaining about sixty per cent of the 
popular vote.  
Although the local cultural identity of the Hong Kong people is strong, it coexists 
with an abstract identification with a historic and cultural vision of the Chinese 
nation and Chinese identity. The official perspective of the Beijing regime on 
national identity, however, sees identification with the Chinese nation as equal to 
identification with the Chinese state and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
(Chang 2001). The civic elements of Hong Kong identity stand in clear opposition 
to this notion of Chinese identity, as the Hong Kong people largely reject the idea 
of “loving” the CCP or the Communist state. 12  This identity clash is further 
intensified by the fact that the PRC national identity’s strong ethnic and cultural 
undertones include xenophobic and anti-Western sentiments (Chang 2001: 137, 
Lo 2008: 174). In fact, Beijing’s understanding of national Chinese culture is a 
hybrid of Communist state culture and a perceived monolithic national culture 
(Chan 2007: 380).  
The ethno-cultural identification of many Hong Kong people with mainland China 
is blended by the Beijing regime with political identification with the CCP to form 
a cultural-political Chinese identity (Lo 2008: 171). Accordingly, patriotism is 
defined through loyalty to the Communist party and the state. In 2004, Xiao 
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Weiyun, a legal expert from Beijing, explained the official definition of un-
patriotic behavior: forging close links with (Western) foreign countries, aligning 
with groups deemed unacceptable to the CCP and questioning the territorial 
integrity of China (that is, supporting independence for Taiwan) (Xiao 2004). For 
many Hong Kong people, however, being part of a modern open society is part of 
their identity, and the pan-democrats promote a Hong Kong style patriotism, 
including democratic and participatory elements, such as, the fight for democracy 
and concrete patriotic actions (Situ 2004a: 174). Democrats reject the claim of the 
CCP to be the only patriotic force, because the party does in fact suppress China’s 
people, destroying Chinese culture and all those aspects which are cherished 
because they represent the idea of a Chinese nation (Situ 2004b: 66). They further 
argue that a liberal democratic expression of the nation is crucial and should be 
drawn from a sovereign people because the nation is composed of neither 
government nor party (Chen 2004: 81).  
 
Identity Politics  
The new emerging local culture and distinct civic identity of Hong Kong are 
however threatened by the forces of globalization (Choi 2007, Ma 2006), as well 
as by Chinese nationalism or sinicization. Nationalism is coming into the Hong 
Kong context on two levels: in the official discourse and policies of the HKSAR 
and Beijing governments, and also through integration and interaction at 
grassroots level.  
For the regime in Beijing, it is impossible to approve of the ideological cohesion 
of a Hong Kong cultural identity constituted against the mainland Chinese 
identity. Any manifestation of a separate, independent cultural identity is viewed 
as a political threat to the regime in Beijing (Lo 2007: 436). Immediately after the 
handover, the Hong Kong government launched several programs and initiated 
policies all aimed at bringing about an active change in the creation of a unified 
Chinese identity. The measures in the educational realm included, for example, 
changes in the school curriculum. The PRC began to be portrayed in a much more 
favorable light, with the focus on economic achievements and rising international 
status (Vickers and Kan 2003). The most controversial measure, however, was the 
introduction of mother-tongue language teaching at secondary schools.
13
 English 
is seen as a form of cultural and symbolic capital that distinguishes Hong Kong 
from the mainland and thus the government’s policy was taken as an attempt to 
alter the collective identity (Chan 2002: 283). The government further 
strengthened the subject “civic education” in schools (Vickers and Kan 2003) and 
the national song and national flag featured prominently at educational 
institutions. To boost the general public’s patriotism and identification with the 
mainland, the government has produced television announcements in the public 
interest (API) entitled “Our Home, Our Country” since 2004, and every day 
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before the evening news the Chinese national anthem together with a clip 
showcasing the achievements and beauty of China and Hong Kong are aired 
(Mathews, Lui and Ma 2008: 74).  
 
Government Identity Discourses  
John Flowerdew (2004) has shown how the administration of Tung Chee-hwa 
stressed the “Chineseness” of Hong Kong, downplayed democratic development 
and emphasized the sameness of the mainland and the SAR. The economic 
discourse predominated, displacing the discussion of democratic reform and 
constitutional development, and trying to depoliticize the city through a discourse 
on stability and promoting Hong Kong as an economic city (Morris P., Kan and 
Morris E. 2000). Hong Kong should also be more culturally integrated with China 
to prevent foreign political and cultural influence, including, most notably, ideas 
like democracy and human rights, from “subverting” the mainland (Loh and Lai 
2007: 29). Tung’s old fashioned governing style, traditional Chinese values and 
ethnic definition of identity were, however, not in tune with the majority of Hong 
Kongers. When Donald Tsang took over the position of Chief Executive, he chose 
a more subtle approach, appearing more open to Hong Kong values and identity 
while maintaining the policies of fostering patriotism and integration with the 
mainland. The discourse on the so-called “New Hong Konger” demonstrates, 
however, that Tsang was carrying forward his predecessor’s political mission. In 
the 2007 policy address, he stated that after 1997, Hong Kongers had been unsure 
about their identity and the economic prospects vis-à-vis a rising China. 
According to his analysis, Hong Kong can only prosper as a fully integrated part 
of the PRC and the HKSAR’s citizens must look at the city’s development “from 
the perspective of our country’s future” (Policy Address 2007). Critics have 
argued that by using the slogan, “New Hong Konger,” Tsang was trying to evoke 
an association with the famous slogan, “New Taiwanese,” which was aimed at 
reconciling the sub-ethnic conflicts in Taiwan (An 2007). Yet they point out that 
the Chief Executive, in fact, attempts to downplay local identity, because, for 
Tsang, Chinese national identity should indeed be equivalent with the “New 
Hongkonger” identity (Zhang 2007).  
 
Grassroots Nationalism 
In addition to the policies and discourses of patriotism shaping and defining Hong 
Kong identity, rapid interaction with the mainland at grassroots level has created a 
form of “grassroots nationalism” (Ma 2007: 149). The bottom-up discourses on 
nationalism are re-shaping the national imagination of Hong Kong people by 
bringing the nation closer to the everyday experience of the general public. The 
Chinese nation is seen by those Hong Kong people who have frequent interactions 
on the mainland as “a great national territory, a collective of a great diversity of 
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people, an embodiment of familial networks and a huge consumer market.” These 
new ideas of the nation could result in the formation of a regional hybrid culture 
incorporating Hong Kong and Chinese components (ibid. 165). He does not, 
however, pursue this idea further to explain how this new cultural identity is 
positioned vis-à-vis the civic identity of Hong Kong.  
 
EVOLUTION OF TAIWAN IDENTITY 
The notion of a unique Taiwan identity is closely connected with the island’s 
history. Taiwan was ruled by the Dutch (1624-1661), became part of the Chinese 
Qing Empire (1683-1895) and eventually a Japanese colony (1895-1945), before 
the administration of the island was taken over by the Republic of China (ROC) 
(Cabestan 2005: 32). The “February 28 Incident” of 1947 marked the affirmation 
of a unique Taiwanese identity and created a demand for autonomy and 
democracy (Chu and Lin 2001: 123). In 1949, with the KMT forces’ to Taiwan, a 
sub-ethnic cleavage emerged between those who had newly arrived from the 
Chinese mainland and the Taiwanese – Han-Chinese who had been living in 
Taiwan for several centuries before 1945. For several decades, the Taiwanese 
were completely excluded from political participation and power in the higher 
levels of the institutions. The local culture and language were suppressed because 
the KMT was intent on propagating its official “great China” nationalism 
(Schubert 1999: 54). When cautious political liberalization began in the 1970s, the 
Taiwanese national identity arose and was expressed in native literature which, 
closely linked with the growing political opposition, called for democracy and 
participation (Hsiau 2000: 91). With democratization in the late 1980s, the idea of 
Taiwanization became increasingly prominent; among its aims were to achieve the 
political and cultural equality of the Taiwanese vis-à-vis the ruling Mainlanders 
and the KMT brand of Chinese nationalism. Policies under the presidencies of Lee 
Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian have contributed to the sharp increase in Taiwan 
identity.
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Theoretically, the discussion on Taiwanese identity can be divided into three basic 
discourses (Schubert 1999). Taiwanese ethno-cultural nationalism states that the 
Taiwan identity is based on specific historical experiences and perceived cultural 
differences between the Taiwan people and the mainland Chinese; the focus is on 
the colonial past of the island and its long separation from the China (Schubert 
1999: 55). In the multi-ethnic nationalism approach, the Taiwanese nation is 
conceptualized as a harmonious, democratic and tolerant nation of four ethnic 
groups, the Mainlanders, the Hoklo, the Hakka, and the aborigines (Zhang 2002). 
According to political or state nationalism, the foundation of a Taiwan nation is in 
line with the institutions of a liberal state. The rise of the Taiwan identity is seen 
as directly connected to its geographical and political separation from China and 
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its subsequent democratic development (Cabestan 2005, Schubert 2004).  
 
HONG KONG AND TAIWAN IDENTITIES 
If Smith’s framework of national identity based on ethno-cultural and civic 
components is applied to the cases of Hong Kong and Taiwan, a series of 
similarities and differences is revealed. For a long time, both identities were 
portrayed as rooted in an envisioned homogenous Chinese race and common 
ancestry. While in Hong Kong, this ethnic element of identity remains strong, in 
Taiwan, there have long been intense discussions on multiculturalism and ethnic 
diversity although the idea of an ethnic Taiwanese nationalism has prevailed in 
some circles of society. Although traditional Chinese culture with its festivals and 
folklore are dominant in both societies, Hong Kong and Taiwan have both 
developed cultural identities different to that on the CCP-ruled mainland. In the 
economic realm, decades of economic boom in Taiwan and Hong Kong, starting 
in the 1960s and lasting until the 1990s, created affluent societies and generated a 
sense of pride in these achievements. Hence differentiation through wealth and 
sophistication from the, at that time, backward PRC prevailed during the first 
encounters with the mainland in the 1970s and 1980s. Local culture and localism 
were regarded as cornerstones of an emerging exceptional culture, different not 
only from the present day mainland way of life, but also from traditional Chinese 
culture. Hong Kong’s cultural uniqueness was based on a newly developed 
popular culture and focus on local affairs using the Cantonese language. In 
Taiwan, the cultural identity also possesses links to modern popular culture, but 
the identity is dominated by native Taiwanese culture and language which were 
suppressed in the first decades of KMT rule. Ideas of multiculturalism are 
common in Taiwan, with its several Chinese sub-ethnicities and the aborigines. 
Interestingly, these ideas have never been given much attention in Hong Kong, 
despite its international city image, its strong Indian community and its global 
workforce. The reason for this is the perception that Hong Kong is a 
predominantly Chinese society, so that the idea of a distinct hybrid culture 
functions as “demarcation and territorialization and carves out a distinct subject 
position for Hong Kong local Chinese only” (Lo 2007: 436).15  
Scholars have argued that the pillar of the distinct identities in both cases is the 
civic realm of national identity (Mathews 1997, Schubert 2004). During the 
colonial era, the rule of law, civil liberties, human rights, a free and vibrant press 
and a responsive government were all things in which Hong Kong citizens felt 
immense pride. With regard to personal freedoms and institutional guarantees, the 
city was much more a part of the Western world than of China. Political 
participation and the desire for democratization became an increasingly important 
part of the Hong Kong identity after the 1980s. The political reforms of the last 
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governor, Chris Patten, responded to these demands with the result that Hong 
Kong core values became further entrenched in Hong Kong society. Hong Kong 
people, since then, have defended their civic identity against real and perceived 
threats from the government. Surveys have consistently indicated that although, 
generally, identification with the Chinese is slowly increasing, Hong Kong people 
still feel distant from China in political and civic terms. This is confirmed by the 
solid support given to political parties and organizations that stand for Hong 
Kong’s core values and further democratization, as well as by the high attendance 
in related political campaigns and rallies.  
Within the civic identity of the Taiwanese, the desire for democracy and the 
equality of the Taiwanese vis-à-vis the Mainlanders are closely connected. In the 
authoritarian era of KMT rule, the opposition saw the practice of democracy and 
the democratization of institutions as the only way of achieving truly equal 
opportunities for all the citizens of Taiwan. The civic identity of the Taiwanese 
was formed through the struggle of the opposition movement for representation 
and the democratic transformation of the KMT government. The experience of a 
successful and peaceful democratic transition is a matter of great pride for the 
Taiwanese. Compared with Hong Kong, civil liberties and democratic values, as 
well as group mobilization and cohesion, are equally, if not more, entrenched in 
the civic identity of the Taiwanese. However, the exceptional status of the rule of 
law as established by the British and, arguably, the core of the local identity 
cannot be observed in Taiwan. On the other hand, the Taiwanese identity is 
partially linked to the vision of an independent state under a different name than 
the current Republic of China. This adds strong political or ideological layers to 
the civic identity and effectively splits the public along lines of pro-unification 
with China, pro-Taiwan independence and pro-status quo.
16
 This extra option of 
de-jure independence is significantly different from the Hong Kong situation, 
because the former colony never had any say in its future. Yet no matter whether 
aiming to establish an independent state under the name of Taiwan or defending 
the ROC’s sovereignty and de-facto independence, the Taiwanese have strong 
emotional ties to their nation. The existence of a de-facto independent state with 
its democratic institutions is crucial for the strength of the civic identity of 
Taiwan. Taiwan’s civic identity thus does not only include values related to 
democracy, freedom and political participation but also the experiences of 
successful democratic struggle and nationhood. These provide an additional tier to 
Taiwan’s national identity which Hong Kong does not have. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Since the late 1990s, Taiwan and Hong Kong have been facing the challenge of a 
rising China rapidly gaining economic and political influence. The Beijing 
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government regards the unique identities and democratic aspirations of the Hong 
Kong and Taiwan people as a danger to its idea of a uniform Chinese identity. 
China’s strategies of identity politics and economic penetration, in particular, pose 
a significant threat to Hong Kong and Taiwan identities (Wu 2007: 298).  
A study of the formation of the Hong Kong identity reveals that the local identity 
developed in relation to an “opposite other,” the Chinese mainland. The concept 
of “Chineseness plus” as the Hong Kong identity has gradually emerged and this 
is based on ethno-cultural and civic identity components, demonstrating a 
superiority over or difference from China which is perceived in terms of economic 
achievements, cultural sophistication and democratic values. When Hong Kong’s 
edge over the PRC was weakened by government policies and rapid integration 
with the mainland, the citizens reacted in several ways. In the cultural sphere, a 
new city consciousness has been emerging, revitalizing a unique local cultural 
identity. When people felt that their core values were being undermined by the 
government, they reacted swiftly. Massive demonstrations and refreshed social 
and democratic movements have highlighted the strength of Hong Kong’s civic 
identity. It can be argued that the civic identity is the cornerstone of Hong Kong’s 
resilient identity. The values of a civic identity are firmly entrenched in the 
collective memory of the city and hence might be able to resist patriotic 
education, nationalistic propaganda and the potential “grassroots nationalism” 
resulting from interaction and integration with the mainland. The fact that on the 
20th anniversary of the 4 June massacre, more than 150.000 people gathered for 
the annual candle-light vigil, among them great numbers of students and 
youngsters not born when the events took place, seems to support this argument 
(Leung and Wu 2009).  
Taiwan, like Hong Kong, is faced with the option of further economic integration 
with the mainland. Since the Ma Ying-jeou administration took over in May 2008, 
cooperation with the PRC has taken off at an unprecedented speed and depth. 
While the majority of the Taiwanese support constructive cooperation, particularly 
in the economic sphere, this development has created fears that if Taiwan moves 
too fast towards the mainland, some of its sovereignty could be surrendered to 
China (Ho 2009). The feeling that the new government is threatening Taiwan’s 
identity, particularly its civic components of democracy and Taiwan sovereignty, 
has led to several mass demonstrations in late 2008 and 2009. These protests 
signify the continuing strength of Taiwanese identity and the resistance of a 
relevant part of society against its possible erosion. Nevertheless, up to now, there 
have not been any clear indications that any main political party does 
fundamentally question Taiwan’s civic identity and its core values, such as the 
island’s sovereignty. Differences among parties appear to be more at the ethno-
cultural identity level, with the KMT still committed to some form of a pan-
Chinese identity.  
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Comparing Hong Kong with Taiwan offers interesting insights into the 
development of the local identities under the concept “one country – two 
systems.” More than a decade after the handover, the unique Hong Kong identity 
is still strongly in existence. This means that, within the Chinese nation state, 
Chinese identity is fragmented. For Taiwan, however, these findings do not have 
any consequences because “one country – two systems” does not present either a 
viable option or an alternative to the status quo. Taiwan has not only a unique 
local identity but, as the Republic of China, it possesses a fully developed national 
identity and there seems to be very little likelihood that the Taiwanese will 
relinquish this in the near future.  
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NOTES 
 
 
                                                        
1
 Anthropologists understand culture as “a more or less consistent pattern of 
thought and action” tied to the “emotional and intellectual mainspring of that 
society” (Benedict 1934: 46). 
2
 It was only in 2006 that the border crossings between Hong Kong and the PRC 
were opened for 24 hours a day. 
3
 Abbas argues that disappearance is the key characteristic of Hong Kong’s 
culture. Dominated by the fluidity of a port-mentality and colonialism, Hong 
Kong did not realize until the late 1970s that it could have a culture of its own. Yet 
this culture was disappearing with colonialism.  
4
 Surveys show that Hong Kong people identify strongly with historic and cultural 
icons of the Chinese nation, like the Great Wall. Some 70 per cent to 80 per cent 
of respondents in a 2006 survey articulated pride for the Great Wall and 60 per 
cent to 70 per cent felt pride in the local cultural icon of the night view of Victoria 
Harbour (Ma and Fung 2007: 177). The former icon symbolizes the abstract 
historic Chinese nation while the latter signifies the collective achievements of 
Hong Kongers in the economic and cultural area.  
5
 Even in spring of 2007, a survey carried out by Radio Television Hong Kong 
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showed that thirty per cent of Hong Kongers would still prefer to be pre-1997 
colonial citizens. “Sancheng Gangren ningdang zhimindi ren” [Thirty per cent of 
Hong Kong people prefer to be colonial subjects], Pingguo Ribao [Apple Daily], 
13 April 2007: A06. 
6
 In 2004, a group of 300 intellectuals, lawyers, professionals and academics 
grouped together to publish a declaration of Hong Kong’s core values, which they 
asked the government to protect. These core values include: “liberty, democracy, 
human rights, rule of law, fairness, social justice, peace and compassion, integrity 
and transparency, plurality, respect for individuals, and upholding 
professionalism.” See, Hong Kong Core Values Declaration. (2006) “Hong Kong 
Core Values Declaration,” 6 June 2004. Online. Available HTTP: 
<http://www.hkcorevalues.org.hk> (accessed 28 February 2007). 
7
 The Civic Party was founded in 2006 and participated in the elections of 2008. 
Their platform is strongly focused on the Hong Kong core values. The party made 
impressive electoral results and is viewed as one of the most respected among the 
Hong Kong parties (DeGolyer 2009). 
8 The bill proposed to provide for the offences of treason, subversion, secession 
and sedition. Criticism was voiced particularly against the following two 
provisions: “the proscription of certain organizations if it is necessary in the 
interests of national security and is proportionate for such purpose” and “the 
power of entry, search, seizure, detention and removal by the police without 
warrant for the investigation of treason, subversion, secession, sedition and 
handling seditious publication.” See, Hong Kong SAR Government, “Views 
Sought on National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill,” 16 April 2003. Online. 
Available HTTP: <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200304/16/0416201.htm> 
(accessed 18 May 2009). 
9
 The daily quota for migrants from the Chinese mainland is 150 per day. An 
estimated 518,000 mainland Chinese became HKSAR citizens between 1997 and 
2007 (Lau 2007). At the same time, more than 200,000 people left the city, 
although the annual emigration figure of Hong Kongers went down from about 
20,000 a year shortly after the handover to close to 10,000 in the 2000s (HKSAR 
Immigration Department 2009).  
10 Research confirmed the impact of education and immigration, because in socio-
political terms, identity choices are influenced by age and birthplace. A 2004 
study points out that being born in Hong Kong makes one more likely to identify 
oneself as a “Hong Kong person.” Youngsters aged eighteen and nineteen 
predominantly describe themselves as “Hong Kong Chinese.” People without any 
patriotic education in school (age 20-25) and those born after 1949 mainly state 
that they are “Hong Kongers,” while the elderly (age 70 and above) are largely 
self-proclaimed “Chinese” (DeGolyer 2004b: 12). 
11
 Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), founded in 1974 (Tsang 
2003: 228). 
12
 When a survey asked participants to measure their love for Hong Kong, the 
Chinese nation and the CCP on a scale of 0-10, Hong Kong received an average 
score of 7.52, the Chinese nation 6.49 and the CCP, a meager 2.91. 24 per cent of 
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the respondents felt uneasy about the CCP (Mathews, Lui and Ma 2008: 107).  
13
 In autumn 1997, the government announced that most secondary schools must 
use Chinese (spoken Cantonese and written traditional Chinese characters) as the 
medium of instruction. 
14
 According to data compiled by the Election Study Center of Taiwan’s National 
Cheng-chi University, the number of people identifying themselves as Taiwanese 
has risen from 17.3 per cent in 1992 to 52.4 per cent in 2010. While in 1992, 26.2 
per cent of Taiwan’s people considered themselves to be Chinese, in 2010, it was 
a mere 3.8 per cent. The second most frequent identity category is a combined 
Taiwanese/Chinese identity, chosen by 40.4 per cent in 2008 (45.4 per cent in 
1992). See, Election Study Center, National Cheng-Chi University Taiwan. 
Available HTTP: http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/ 
english/modules/tinyd2/content/TaiwanChineseID.htm  (accessed 29 September 
2010). 
15 Racism and ethnic discrimination continue to be a serious problem in Hong 
Kong society, although the HKSAR government portrays the city as “Asia’s 
World City” and a multicultural society (Loper 2001). The anti-racism bill of 2008 
was widely criticized as being too weak and excluding the widespread 
discrimination against the mainland Chinese (Ewing 2008).  
16
According to different surveys, the majority of the Taiwanese prefer the status 
quo with regard to the question of independence or unification with China. This 
has been a constant trend since 1992. In 2010, 36.6 per cent of respondents 
favored the status quo with a decision at some point later in the future, while 23 
per cent wished the status quo to continue indefinitely. The second largest group 
supports independence for Taiwan, either immediately (6.3 per cent) or after 
maintaining the status quo first, in the future (17.0 per cent). The survey results 
also show that the number of people supporting unification with China has 
constantly fallen since 1992. In 1992, 4.4 per cent supported unification as soon as 
possible; in 2010 it was only a meager 1.1 per cent. In 2010, 10.0 per cent opted 
for the status quo and the movement towards unification in the future; in 1992, it 
was still 15.6 per cent. See, Election Study Center, National Cheng-Chi University 
Taiwan. Available HTTP: http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/ 
english/modules/tinyd2/content/tonduID.htm (accessed 29 September 2010).  
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE 1 
Self-description of Hong Kong people with regard to identity
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